Abstract
I. INTRODUCTION o authenticate the legitimacy of the remote users over insure channel, a remote password authentication scheme is used. In such a scheme, the password often regarded as a secret shared between the authentication server (AS) and serves to authenticate the identity of the individual logging on to the server. Through the knowledge of the password, the remote user can use it to create a valid login message to the authentication server. AS checks the validity of the login message to provide the access right. Password authentication schemes with smart cards have a long history in the remote user authentication environment. So far different types of password authentication schemes with smarts cards [1] - [3] - [4] - [5] - [6] - [11] - [13] - [14] - [18] have been proposed.
In 1981, Lamport [12] proposed a remote password authentication scheme using a password table to achieve user authentication. In 2000, Hwang and Li [13] pointed that Lamport' s scheme suffered with the risk of a modified password table and the cost of protecting and maintaining the password table. Further, they also proposed a new remote user authentication scheme using smart cards, which is based on the 1 Manoj Kumar is with the Department of Applied Sciences and Humanities, Sharda Group of Institutions (SGI), Jawahar Nagar, Khandri, Agra, India -282004, (e-mail: yamu_balyan@yahoo.co.in Chayayamu@yahoo.co.in) most popular ElGamal's Cryptosystem [15] . This scheme [13] does not maintain the password table to check the validity of the login request. Also, it can withstand message-replaying attack.
In [7] , Chan and Cheng pointed out an attack on the HwangLi's scheme. In 2003, Shen-Lin-Hwang [9] discussed a different attack on the Hwang-Li's scheme and they also proposed a modified scheme to prevent the attacks on HwangLi's scheme. In the same year, Chang and Hwang [3] explained the practical problems of the Chan -Cheng's attack on the Hwang-Li's scheme and Leung -Cheng -Fong and Chen [10] pointed out that the Shen-Lin-Hwang's scheme is still vulnerable to the attack proposed by Chan and Cheng. In 2004, Awasthi -Lal [1] proposed an enhanced remote user authentication scheme using smart cards.
A. Contributions
This paper aims to show that Awasthi -Lal's scheme required more information for the execution of the login phase. This paper also presents a modified remote user authentication scheme to remove the problems of Awasthi -Lal's scheme.
B. Organization
Section II reviews the Hwang -Li's scheme [13] . Section III describes the cryptanalysis of Hwang -Li's scheme. Section IV reviews the Shen-Lin-Hwang's scheme [9] . Section V reviews the Leung -Cheng -Fong and Chen [10] attack on Shen-Lin-Hwang's scheme. Section VI reviews the AwasthiLal's scheme [1] . Section VII yields an objection on the Awasthi -Lal's scheme and pointed out the problem of the scheme. An improved variant of remote user authentication scheme is presented in section VIII. The security of the proposed scheme is discussed in section IX. Finally, comes to a conclusion in the section X.
II. REVIEW OF THE HWANG-LI'S SCHEME
There are three phases in the Hwang-Li's scheme: the registration phase, login phase and the authentication phase. In the registration phase, the user U sends a request to the AS for the registration. The AS will issue a smart card and a password to every user legal through a secure channel. In the login Phase, when the user U wants to access the AS, she/he inserts her/his smart card to the smart card reader and then keys the identity and the password to access services. In the T authentication phase, the AS checks the validity of the login request.
A. Registration Phase
User U submits her/his ID to the AS. AS computes the password PW for the user U, as,
where, x s is a secret key maintained by the AS and p is a large prime number. AS provides a password PW and a smart card to the user U through a secure channel. The smart card contains the public parameters ( f, p), where f is a one-way function.
B. Login Phase
User U attaches her/his smart card to the smart card reader and keys ID and PW. The smart card will perform the following operations:
1. Generate a random number r.
where T is the current date and time of the smart card reader.
Sends a login request
C = (ID, C 1 , C 2 , T) to the AS.
B. C. Authentication Phase
Assume AS receives the message C at time T c , where T c is the current date and time at AS. Then the AS takes the following actions:
1. Check the format of ID. If the identity format is not correct, then AS will rejects this login request. 2. Check, whether T c -T ≤ ∆ T, where ∆ T is the legal time interval due to transmission delay, if not, then rejects the login request C.
f (T ⊕ PW) mod p, then the AS accepts the login request. Otherwise, the login request will be rejected.
III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE HWANG-LI SCHEME

A. Chan and Cheng's Attack
According to Chan and Cheng [7] , a legal user Alice can easily generate a valid pair of identity and password without the knowledge of secrete key 'x s ' of AS. Alice uses her valid pair (ID A , PW A ) to generate another valid pair (ID B , PW B ) as follows:
Alice computes ID B = (ID A × ID A ) mod p. Then, she can computes the corresponding password With the knowledge of PW B , Bob can compute
As a result, Bob can masquerade as Alice to login a remote server and gain access privilege.
C. Chang-Hwang's Attack
According to Chang and Hwang [2] , there is a mistake in the Chan-Cheng' s attack. It is not always possible that the square of a legal identity satisfies the specific identity format. Chang and Hwang generalized the Chan-Cheng' s attack. They described two attacks. Chang and Hwang pointed out that in Hwang -Li's scheme, it is still difficult to obtain the corresponding password for a known arbitrary valid identity, but once the valid identity is generated, its corresponding password will be obtained easily.
IV. SHEN, LIN AND HWANG'S SCHEME
Shen-Lin-Hwang [9] proposed a modified remote user authentication scheme to solve the security pitfall of the Hwang-Li's scheme. Shen-Lin-Hwang's scheme uses the concept of hiding the identity to prevent the masquerading attack. They modified the registration phase, now a shadow identity SID will be issued to the legal user. This modified in the registration phase is described below.
A. Modified Registration Phase
A user U submits her/his identity string J to the AS for the registration. The string J contains the name, address, unique number etc. This information in the string J is unique for every user. Then the AS computes a pair (SID, PW) for the user U after the identity J is identified. The pair (SID, PW) is computed as follows:
where, Red (.) is a shadow identity of device which is only maintained in the remote server and S ID is the shadow identity of the user U. Furthermore, the AS distributes the smart card and (SID, PW) to the user U in a secure way. The smart card contains the public parameters ( f, p).
In this scheme, the message sent to the AS now contains (SID, C 1 , C 2 , T) . Because J i specially formatted, the evil user cannot compute new identity string J i via SID i .
V. CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE SHEN, LIN AND HWANG'S SCHEME
A. Leung-Cheng-Fong -Chan's Attack
According to Leung-Cheng-Fong-Chan [10] , Shen-LinHwang's scheme [9] defends the attacks of registration for a new identity ID B via ID A for a legal user Alice. They also pointed out that the modified scheme is still vulnerable to the attack described by Chan and Cheng. They showed that the modified scheme is not secure against the attack that is similar to Chan -Cheng and Chang -Hwang's attacks. If we replace ID A with SID A , then the Chang and Hwang's attack will work as follows.
Alice computes SID B = (SID A ) k mod p, where k is a random number. Then, he can computes the corresponding password
As a result, a legal user Alice can impersonate other user
Bob with a valid pair of (SID B , PW B ) to login the AS. If SID A is a primitive root of Zp, then all the valid identities and their corresponding password can be generated easily. Since, Chan -Cheng' s attack is one case of this attack so it also works well.
VI. REVIEW OF THE AWASTHI -LAL 'S SCHEME
Awasthi and Lal [1] suggested a new way to enhance the security of the Shen-Lin-Hwang's scheme [9] against Leung-Cheng-Fong-Chan's attack [10] . This section provides a review of Awasthi and Lal's scheme.
A. Initialization Phase
In this phase, the AS generates the following parameters p : a large prime number. f : a one-way function. x s : a secret key of the system, which is only possessed with the AS. Red (.) : a function which is re-direct the identity of the user and only possessed with the AS.
B. Registration Phase
User U submits her/his identity ID to the AS. Then, AS computes the followings: SID = Red (ID) , and PW =( SID) x s mod p.
The AS distributes the smart card and the pair (SID, PW) to the user U. The smart card contains the public parameters (f, p).
C. Login Phase
To login at any time T, the user U attaches her/his smart card and keys her/his identity ID and password PW. The smart card does the following:
Computes
r mod p. 6. Sends a message L R = (ID, C 1 , C 2 , T) to the AS.
D. Authentication Phase
Assume that the AS receives the login request L R at time T S . Then, AS does the following steps:
1. Test the validity of the ID. 
)(SID)
f (T ⊕ PW) mod p, then the AS accepts the login request. Otherwise, the login request will be rejected by AS.
VII. OUR OBJECTION
This section analyzes the login phase of Awasthi and Lal's scheme. Although Awasthi and Lal suggested a different way to enhance the security of Shen-Lin-Hwang's scheme [9] against Leung-Cheng-Fong-Chan 's attack. But, when we observe the login phase of Awasthi and Lal's scheme, it is found that the user U/smart card does not provide complete information for the execution and proper running of the login phase.
In Awasthi and Lal's scheme to login at any time T, the user U attaches her/his smart card to the smart card reader and keys her/his identity ID and password PW. In the second steps, the smart card computes C 1 = (SID) r mod p, while the number SID neither stored in the smart card nor this number is supplied by the user U at the time of login.
In the login phase, we observe that the information which are provided by the User U and through the smart for the login to AS are not sufficient for the functioning of the login phase. However, the scheme is not fit for the practically implementation.
Consequently, the login phase of Awasthi and Lal's scheme does not work properly due to the lack of information. As a result, Awasthi and Lal's scheme is not suitable for real grounds.
VIII. AN IMPROVED SCHEME
This section modifies Awasthi and Lal's scheme to attain better and proper functioning. The proposed scheme is an improved variant of the original scheme: Hwang and Li's scheme. The modified scheme is described below.
A . Initialization Phase
In this phase, the AS generates the following parameters p : a large prime number.
f : a one-way function. x s : a secret key of the system, which is only possessed with the AS. Red (.) : a function which is re-direct the identity of the user and only possessed with the AS.
B. Registration Phase
Assume that this phase is executed over a secure channel. User U submits her/his identity ID to the AS. Then, AS computes the followings:
S ID = Red (ID) and PW =(S ID ) x s mod p.
Here S ID is the redirected identity corresponding to the registered identity ID. The AS distributes the smart card and (S ID ID , PW) to the user U in a secure way (say physically). The smart card contains the public parameters (f, p).
C. Login Phase
The user U attaches her/his smart card to the smart card reader at any time T and keys her/his identity S ID ID and password PW. The smart card conducts the following computations:
D. Authentication Phase
Assume that the AS receives the login request L R at time T c . Then, AS does the following computations to check the validity of the login request L R . 
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IX. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE IMPROVED SCHEME
The above scheme is a modified form of the original scheme: Hwang-Li's scheme. The security analysis has been already discussed and demonstrated in [13] . Therefore, this section will only discuss the enhanced security features of the proposed scheme.
A. Shen-Lin-Hwang's attack
The functionality of the redirected function Red (.) blocks the masquerade attack via registration phase: Shen-LinHwang's attack. The function Red ( . ) generates a valid number S ID with the help of the identity ID, which is sent by the user U at the time of registration request. The eavesdropper cannot compute a valid S ID for any fake identity ID F .
Thus, Bob cannot masquerades as Alice. For the reason, this scheme is secure against the masquerading attack.
B. Chan-Cheng's attack and Chang-Hwang's Attack
The functionality of the redirected function Red (.) also blocks the attacks via authentication phase: Chan-Cheng's attack, Chang-Hwang' 
